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The Myths and Reality of 
Deindustrialization in Sweden: 




This article analyzes three possible hypotheses behind deindustrialization in Sweden. 
The main conclusion is that deindustrialization is both a myth and a reality. There has 
been a decrease in manufacturing employment in both relative and absolute terms in the 
post-war period, and the share of nominal GDP has gone in the same direction. 
However, the high productivity growth in manufacturing has lead to an increase in its 
share of real GDP since the beginning of the 1990's. Using input-output analysis, it is 
shown that the loss of employed who work with satisfying final demand for manufactured 
goods is less pronounced than what is shown by official statistics. The explanation for 
this is a deeper interaction with the rest of the economy, particularly in relation to 
knowledge-intensive service industries. 
RÉSUMÉ
Cet article présente l'analyse de trois hypothèses possibles pour expliquer la 
désindustrialisation en Suède. Sa principale conclusion est que la désindustrialisation est 
à la fois mythe et réalité. Pendant l'après-guerre, l'emploi a chuté de façon relative et 
absolue dans le secteur de la fabrication, et sa part du PIB nominal a suivi cette tendance. 
Néanmoins, depuis le début des années 1990, la croissance rapide de la productivité du 
secteur de la fabrication a entraîné une hausse de sa part du PIB réel. L'analyse des 
intrants et extrants permet de montrer que la chute du nombre de personnes qui 
travaillent pour répondre à la demande finale de produits manufacturés est moins 
marquée que la chute de l'emploi dans le secteur de la fabrication, selon sa stricte 
définition. Ce changement serait causé par une intégration accrue de la fabrication au 
reste de l'économie compte tenu des secteurs de service à forte intensité de savoir, 
apportent davantage d'intrants à la fabrication.
IN THE LAST THIRTY YEARS, the share of manu-
facturing in total world GDP has decreased. 
Simultaneously, there has been a fall in manufac-
turing employment in the Western world. This 
structural change is defined as deindustrialization 
and started in the United States at the beginning 
of the 1960s.2 Since then, almost all rich countries 
experienced this trend, although at different 
1 The author is chief economist at the Swedish white collar trade union called Unionen. An earlier version of the 
article was published in Swedish in the Journal of the Swedish Economic Association (2010/7). Email: 
daniel.lind@unionen.se 
2 See, for example, Rowthorn and Ramaswamy (1997), Rowthorn and Coutts (2004), Nickell et al. (2008) 
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speeds and to different degrees.3
Sweden has been part of this. Despite dein-
dustrialization being a well-known phenome-
non, an understanding about its causes is still 
relatively limited. From a Swedish perspective, 
this article aims at critically analyzing three of 
the hypotheses usually emphasized as possible 
explanations for the deindustrialization.4 These 
are: (1) demand for manufactured goods 
decreases as countries become richer; (2) faster 
productivity growth in manufacturing compared 
to the service sector; (3) manufacturing has been 
focusing on its core activities and has deepened 
its interaction with other sectors in the econ-
omy.
The article is structured as follows. The next 
section presents an overview of the process of 
deindustrialization in Sweden. The next three 
sections analyze the three hypotheses. The arti-
cle concludes with a summarizing discussion.
Swedish Deindustrialization
Three indicators are usually used to identify 
and analyze deindustrialization: (1) the number 
of employed in manufacturing, (2) the share of 
manufacturing employment in relation to total 
employment and (3) the share of manufacturing 
in nominal GDP.5 
On the basis of these indicators, the Swedish 
industrialization and deindustrialization process 
is summarized in Chart 1. Industrialization 
became increasingly intensive in the latter part 
of the 19th century and continued over the 
World Wars until the 1950s, but then reached a 
plateau. After that, the phase of deindustrializa-
tion started. Both the sector’s share of nominal 
GDP and relative employment reached their 
highest levels already in 1951, even if the level in 
the latter case was almost as high ten years later. 
In absolute terms, manufacturing employment 
reached its highest level in 1965 (1,263 thou-
sand). After that there has been a gradual 
decrease and in 2007 it amounted to 722 thou-
sand.6 This means that the number of employed 
has returned to the same level as in the latter 
part of the 1920s and the first years of the 1930s. 
The downturn is even more pronounced in rela-
tive terms – one has to go back to the years 
around the previous turn of the century in order 
to find an equally low level of relative manufac-
turing employment.
Despite this considerable structural change, 
Palma (2004) argues that the development in 
Sweden – at least between 1960 and 1998 – fol-
3 It is mainly employment in textiles and metal production manufacturing that has decreased in G7 countries 
since the 1970s.
4 See, for example, Schettkat and Yocarini (2003). A fourth hypothesis is the increase in trade with low-
cost countries. Rowthorn and Coutts (2004) estimate that about 5 million manufacturing jobs were lost 
in the Western world between 1992 and 2002 due to this trade.
5 See, for example, Rowthorn and Coutts (2004), Nickell et al. (2008) and Palma (2004).
6 Note that the series until 2000 are from Edvinsson (2005) and those after that from the national 
accounts of Statistics Sweden. For all three variables, the levels are higher in Edvinsson’s statistics. Thus, 
the downturn since the beginning of the new millennium is somewhat overestimated.
Chart 1 
Manufacturing in Sweden, 1800-2007
Sources: Edvinsson (2005), Statistics Sweden and own calculations. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 31 
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lows an average pattern of deindustrialization 
that many other developed countries also have 
experienced.7 
Swedish deindustrialization is characterized 
by periods with favorable output and labour pro-
ductivity growth, but also the opposite. This is 
summarized in Chart 2. Average yearly output 
growth in manufacturing amounted to 3.9 per 
cent between 1950 and 2007. With an average 
labour productivity growth of 4.6 per cent, this 
means that the average decrease in hours worked 
was 0.7 per cent per year. The first two decades 
are characterized by rapid output growth at the 
same time as this demand was mainly met by an 
improved productivity, but also by a slight 
increase in employment.8 The second – notori-
ous – phase is characterized by weak demand and 
low productivity growth. In terms of employ-
ment and production, the 1970s is the worst 
decade since the 1950s and the 1980s the corre-
sponding decade when it comes to productivity 
growth. 
The third, more favorable phase of deindus-
trialization began with the crisis years at the 
beginning of the 1990s and lasted until the 
financial crisis in 2008. With an average yearly 
productivity growth of about 6 per cent per year 
since 1990, this means that output would have 
had to grew at an even faster pace for employ-
ment to increase.9 This has not been the case, 
and employment has continued to decrease. 
Deindustrialization in Sweden is a fact – there 
has been a decrease in the manufacturing sec-
tor’s share of nominal GDP and also in its rela-
tive and absolute employment. The question is: 
what can explain these developments? 
Changes in the Composition 
of Demand
Engel’s law was established to describe how 
the relative consumption of food decreased 
when the Western world was industrialized. In 
the same way, the sociologist Daniel Bell (1976) 
has established the theory of postindustrial soci-
ety. This theory predicts a decrease in household 
demand for manufactured goods in favor of a 
larger share of services when GDP per person 
grows.10 The theory of a growing service society 
thus takes its starting point in the hierarchy of 
needs that the human nature is assumed to have. 
When our basic material needs have been satis-
7 Palma (2004) also shows that the inverted U-relation is not constant over time; countries that have been 
industrialized at a later stage than the Western world have reached their inflection point at an increasingly 
lower level of GDP per person.
8 More hours worked is of course translated into higher employment when the current staff cannot work 
additional hours.
9 For the 1990-2007 period, no other country in the Western world experienced such strong output and 
labour productivity growth in manufacturing as did Sweden.
10 Expressed differently: the income elasticity for services is larger than one. Summers (1985) is an ambi-
tious attempt at establishing the connection between demand for services and the level of development 
at the global level. Depending on what price deflators are used, he obtains different results.
Chart 2 
Manufacturing in Sweden: Output and Labour Productivity 
Growth, 1950-2007
(average annual rate of change)
Sources: BLS and own calculations. 32 NUMBER 22, FALL 2011 
fied, an increasing share of our consumption is 
directed towards services which are assumed to 
increase our quality of life in a broader sense. As 
a consequence, there will be a decrease in manu-
facturing employment – in absolute and relative 
terms – and in the sector’s share of nominal 
GDP. 
Has there been a decrease in demand for man-
ufactured goods in favor of more services during 
the process of Swedish deindustrialization?
The question can be answered from several 
indicators. The most important of them are pre-
sented in Table 1. From this table, it appears, 
from Panel A, that the output growth of manufac-
tured goods has been higher than for services 
since 1980 and that this is explained by a favorable 
relative – and absolute – growth since the begin-
ning of the 1990s. It thus follows that there is no 
indication that the structure of demand is becom-
ing more service oriented. In the last 15 years, 
with an intensified globalization and even higher 
competitive pressure in the manufacturing sector, 
the trends in output have in this sense gone in the 
opposite direction. The question is, however, to 
what extent this strong output growth is due to an 
increasing need in the surrounding world for 
imports of manufactured goods produced in Swe-
den.
As appears from Panel B, there has been a 
decrease in the share of goods in nominal, 
domestic consumption since 1980, even if the 
trend has largely remained unchanged since 
Table 1 
Indicators of the Composition of Demand in the Swedish Economy
Source: Statistics Sweden and author’s calculations.
Panel A. Output growth, 1980-2007 (average annual rate of change)
1980-2007 1980-90 1990-2000
Total economy 2.4 2.2 2.1
Private sector 3.1 2.5 3.1
Manufacturing 4.2 1.9 5.4
Service sector 3.0 2.8 2.9
Panel B. Household consumption, 1980-2007 (period average)
Share of nominal consumption 1980-2007 1980-90 1990-2000
Goods 0.54 0.61 0.50
Services 0.46 0.39 0.50
Durable goods 0.09 0.10 0.08
Share of real consumption 1980-2007 1980-90 1990-2000
Goods 0.50 0.52 0.48
Services 0.50 0.48 0.52
Durable goods 0.09 0.07 0.07
Panel C. Nominal demand for manufactured goods, shares, 1995-2005 (average share)
1995-2005
Domestic economy: household demand 0.15
Domestic economy: final demand 0.33
Domestic economy: total demand 0.32
Total economy: household demand 0.22
Total economy: final demand 0.38
Total economy: total demand 0.38 INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 33 
1990. In the same way, there has been an 
increase in the relative consumption of services. 
However, the picture is not unambiguous. 
When it comes to nominal consumption of 
durable goods, the share has been constant since 
1980.
In real, inflation-adjusted terms, the share of 
consumption of goods of total consumption has 
largely remained unchanged since 1980, and for 
durable goods the increase is considerable since 
the mid 1990s. The explanation for this is that the 
falling relative prices for goods mean that house-
holds can consume as much goods as before, but at 
the same time still have money left to increase their 
consumption of more (and relatively more expen-
sive) services.11 Since the 1980s, there has not been 
any decrease in the quantity of manufactured 
goods for which there is a demand by Swedish 
households, but the shift in relative prices has 
resulted in a decrease in the share of goods in nom-
inal terms, in particular after the 1980s.12
An additional indicator of the consumption 
structure is obtained by studying the input-out-
put-tables of Statistics Sweden. When imports 
and exports are excluded, the first line in Panel 
C shows that there has been an decrease in nom-
inal household demand for manufactured goods 
between 1995 and 2005 – from 15 to 12 per cent. 
A similar pattern emerges from the other 
domestic indicators: the share of manufactured 
goods in final and total demand (intermediate 
and final demand). 
However, the last three lines show that the 
pattern is somewhat different if trade with the 
outside world is included. Household demand 
for manufactured goods has remained 
unchanged in nominal terms if it is taken into 
account that imports of manufactured goods 
that target household demand are larger than 
the corresponding demand for services. The 
same also applies for final and total demand: the 
share of manufactured goods in final and total 
demand has remained unchanged since 1995 if 
trade with the surrounding world is included. 
Considering that there has been a fall in relative 
prices for manufactured goods between 1995 
and 2005, this means that there has probably 
been an increase rather than a decrease in their 
share of total household real aggregate demand 
and of final and total demand since the mid 
1990s. 
Altogether, Table 1 indicates that the deindus-
trialization – at least since 1980 – cannot be 
explained by a weaker demand for manufactured 
goods; in some (but not all) respects, there has 
been a decrease in nominal demand, but there 
are no indications of this having been the case in 





Baumol and Bowen (1966) established what 
later came to be called Baumol’s cost disease 
within artistic activities.14 One of Baumol´s 
basic assumptions is that in real terms, the 
demand for services is independent of the level 
11 Since 1990, there has been a decrease in the prices for household consumption of durable goods. Between 
1990 and 2007, prices fell by about 3 per cent per year. This considerable change in relative prices probably 
explains why household demand for durable goods has grown about three times as quickly as household con-
sumption of services since the beginning of the 1990s.
12 Jansson (2008) has a similar line of reasoning.
13 The indicators of the total economy in Panel C in Table 1 shows that these shares are considerably larger 
than the corresponding ones in Chart 1. Depending on whether the output or the user side of the econ-
omy is studied, there are different conclusions about the importance of the manufacturing sector; in 
2005, 38 per cent of total demand was spent on imports of manufactured goods, while the employment 
share only amounted to 17 per cent.
14 In the following year, Baumol (1967) generalized the argument, which was further developed in Baumol 




































































































of income and, as a consequence, the share of 
services in real GDP is constant over time. But 
the assumption of a higher productivity growth 
in manufacturing than in services means – along 
with an approximately similar increase in wages 
in all parts of the economy – that there is a 
decrease over time in manufacturing’s share of 
nominal GDP and of total employment. The 
falling nominal share of GDP is explained by 
productivity driven changes in relative prices. In 
order to keep an even pace with output growth 
within manufacturing, there must be a gradual 
increase in employment in the service sector.15
These developments are not explained by a 
change in the patterns of demand, however; 
rather, it is the result of changes in supply condi-
tions. Deindustrialization can thus occur despite 
relative demand for manufactured goods 
remaining unchanged. 
Let us study Baumol’s explanations for a 
shrinking manufacturing sector. From Chart 3, 
it is clear that the productivity level – in contrast 
to Baumol’s theory – on average is not lower in 
the service sector than in manufacturing. What 
is shown in the chart is rather that Swedish post-
war history is about manufacturing – thanks to a 
higher average productivity growth – having 
caught up with the service sector. By the finan-
cial crisis in 2008, this period of catching up had 
been completed. 
As Chart 3 shows, the finance- and real estate 
sectors explain a significant part of the high pro-
ductivity level in the service sector. However, 
even without these industries manufacturing did 
not catch up with the service sector until around 
the turn of the millennium. In particular, the 
real estate business, with a productivity level of 
1,100 Swedish Krona (SEK) per hour in 2007, 
substantially contributes to the average in the 
service sector. But the same argument can be 
used for certain parts of manufacturing. In the 
same year, the chemical products industry 
showed a productivity level of slightly more than 
SEK 4,100 per hour and electronics and telecom 
a level of slightly more than SEK 3,000 per hour. 
It is an incorrect statement that the productivity 
level in the service sector on average is lower 
than in manufacturing.16 
Since 1980, Baumol is, from this perspective, 
both right and wrong: the productivity level is 
not higher in manufacturing but productivity 
growth has been considerably higher in this 
period, in particular since the 1990s. The ques-
tion is how this has affected the development of 
the nominal and real share of manufacturing 
GDP.
Baumol’s hypothesis is that the difference in 
productivity growth between manufacturing 
and the service sector results in a decrease in the 
relative prices of manufactured goods. Accord-
ing to Chart 4, this is indeed what has happened 
since 1980. When the differences in productiv-
15 Asymptotically, this means that productivity growth in the economy is in the end entirely determined by the 
service sector since this is where everyone will be employed.
16 See ITPS (2008) for an analysis of the characteristics of different types of service industries, where some 
have qualities that are more similar to those of manufacturing. 
Chart 3 
Labour Productivity Levels in Sweden, 1980-2007

























































Manufacturing: share of real GDP








ity growth between manufacturing and the ser-
vice sector were smaller, their prices increased at 
approximately the same rate. But as – absolute 
and relative – productivity growth took off in 
manufacturing after 1990, there has not only 
been an increased divergence in relative prices, 
but also average prices within manufacturing 
have fallen in absolute terms. This is partly 
explained by an increased share of telecom prod-
ucts in total manufacturing production, but also 
in other parts of the sector has the price increase 
come to a halt since the mid-1990s.
The mirror image of the changed price trend in 
manufacturing – most likely not only an effect of 
an impressive productivity growth but also of an 
intensified globalization and increased imports of 
intermediate goods – is that there has been an 
increase in its share of real GDP in the same 
period. At the same time as there has been a slight 
decrease in its nominal share since 1980 (even if 
not to any remarkable extent), the weakly falling 
trend until the beginning of the 1990s has, in 
accordance with Chart 5, turned into a period 
where there has been a significant increase in the 
share of manufacturing in real GDP since the 
mid-1990s.17 This means that in terms of physical  
quantity of output produced, in the last 15 years 
manufacturing increased its share of the total 
economy real output by almost 70 per cent and 
since 1980 by slightly more than 50 per cent. At 
the same time, there has been a decrease in man-
ufacturing employment by more than 30 per cent 
and there has been a fall in the sector’s share of 
nominal GDP. In this latter perspective, deindus-
trialization is entirely about changes in relative 
prices driven by differences in productivity 
growth between manufacturing and the service 
sector. In terms of units produced, the period 
17 However, real shares should be handled with caution. This is certainly the case with chain-aggregated data. 
One reason for this is that the non-additivity, which follows from the chain method and its yearly updated 
price weights, means that the real aggregate of sector X and Y is not the arithmetic sum of the real series for 
X and Y. This implies that real shares will not necessarily sum to unity when different sectors are related to 
total GDP. Hence, the real share in Chart 5 should not be seen as a “true” share. See Whelan (2002) for a more 
thorough discussion. 
Chart 5 
Nominal and Real GDP Shares in Swedish Manufacturing, 
1980-2007
 



































































Value Added Price Developments, Manufacturing  
and the Service Sector, 1980-2007
Index (1980 = 100)
Sources: Statistics Sweden and author’s calculations. 36 NUMBER 22, FALL 2011 
since 1980 has instead been characterized by a 
clear reindustrialization. 
The growing divergence in productivity 
growth rates between manufacturing and ser-
vices – which in the last 15 years has increased 
from an average of 1.5 to almost to four percent-
age points a year – also means that, at a given 
level of relative demand, deindustrialization has 
been intensified in terms of employment. But 
output growth in manufacturing has in fact since 
1990 been about twice as high per year as in the 
service sector. This is the reason why the share 
of manufacturing employment in total employ-
ment has not fallen more than what has actually 
been the case.
In absolute terms, the rapid productivity 
growth in manufacturing during the entire post-
war era means that there has been a decrease in 
employment. With an average yearly labour 
productivity growth of 6 per cent in the last 15 
years, this means that there must have been a 
much higher output growth for manufactured 
goods in the 1990s and 2000s than in the 1970s 
and the 1980s for not causing a fall in manufac-
turing employment. Given no effect on demand, 
a productivity growth in the last 15 years on par 
with the development in the 1980s, would have 
led to an increase in manufacturing employment 
by 2.5-3 per cent per year.18 
Altogether, this means that labour productiv-
ity growth in manufacturing is an important 
explanation behind the reduced employment in 
this sector – in both relative and absolute terms 
– despite the fact that demand having grown 
considerably faster than GDP in the last 25 
years. This is also the explanation for deindus-
trialization in terms of nominal GDP since 1980 
and the reindustrialization in real terms during 
the same period. 
Greater Interaction between 
Manufacturing and the Rest 
of the Economy
Another supply-oriented explanation for the 
deindustrialization is that firms increasingly buy 
the intermediate goods that were previously 
produced in-house. Due to technological devel-
opment and globalization, firms have greater 
possibilities – both at the national and the global 
level – to increase their degree of specialization 
and separate parts of the production process.19
Not the least for many manufacturing firms does 
this apply for services in general and business 
services in particular. Another aspect that points 
in the same direction is that many manufactur-
ing firms today include an increasing number of 
services in their work at developing, producing, 
and marketing their products. This includes 
everything from R&D, IT-services, publicity 
and financial services to logistics, legal advice, 
and training/education. A manufactured good is 
to a smaller degree a "product" and increasingly 
a carrier of "services" that create extra value 
added.
Deindustrialization in this sense is thus about 
statistical reallocations of businesses and the fact 
that more services are required to deliver a man-
ufactured good, rather than about a smaller 
number of employees in manufacturing.20 A 
broader definition of the sector would include 
those intermediate goods that are required in 
order to meet final demand for manufactured 
goods and what was formerly included in manu-
facturing in the national accounts. 
Input-output-analysis (IO) is an often used 
method for analyzing the interaction between 
manufacturing and the rest of the economy and 
its development over time. The starting point is 
to study the flow of intermediate goods between 
18 Basic arithmetic indicates that the decrease in manufacturing employment in the 1970s and 1980s would have 
been much more significant if productivity growth in this period had reached the levels of the 1990s and 
2000s (for a given demand).
19 The interaction between industries can be expressed in several ways. See for example Wölfl (2006) for a 
theoretical survey. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 37 
Manufacturing: employment multiplier


















































Numbers of employed in the private service sector due to 
final demand of manufactured goods
sectors and from this calculate how much pro-
duction/employment increases in the whole 
economy, including at all levels of subcontrac-
tors, when there is an increase in final demand in 
individual sectors.21 One can calculate the total 
number of persons involved in the production of 
manufactured goods, independent of where in 
the economy they are employed.
Chart 6 shows that there has been an increase 
in the number of employed in the private service 
sector who work to meet final demand for man-
ufactured goods from around 200 thousand in 
1975 to almost 300 thousand in 2005 – an 
increase of almost 50 per cent.22 It also appears 
that the contribution of manufacturing to 
employment in the service sector was at its high-
est during the boom year of 2000. Five years 
later, the number had been reduced by more 
than 40 000 individuals.
The employment multiplier of manufacturing 
shows how much additional employment is on 
average generated by each manufacturing 
employee. This indicator fell between 1975 and 
1985. Then, it took off, and finally fell somewhat 
between 2000 and 2005. Each manufacturing 
worker generated an average of 1.14 jobs in the 
private sector (including manufacturing) in 2005. 
Through the combination of a decrease in manu-
facturing employment and a rise in the indirectly 
employed in the private service sector, there has 
been a large increase in the employment multiplier 
for the service sector since 1985. In 1975, each 
manufacturing employee generated an average of 
0.34 indirectly employed in the service sector. By 
2005, the number of employed had doubled to 
0.67. 
Manufacturing employment has decreased by 
more than 450 thousand in the official statistics 
since 1975. But a greater interaction between 
manufacturing and non-manufacturing indus-
tries in general and the service sector in particu-
20 In the official statistics, firms and workplaces are classified according to their main business. This means that 
a firm belongs to manufacturing if its main task is to produce manufactured goods. The effect of this is that 
small changes in the business might mean that firms are reclassified and, thus, the employees will also belong 
to a new sector. Statistics Sweden (2010) shows that reclassifications are relatively common, but that the net 
flow between manufacturing and the service sector cannot explain the fall in manufacturing employment in 
the period 1990-2007. The National Board of Trade (2010) shows, according to the same line of reasoning, 
that the manufacturing share of employment and GDP has not fallen as quickly between 1997 and 2006 if 
company group data is taken as the starting point. The explanation for this is that those firms that belong to 
the service sector are then included in the group of manufacturing companies.
21 See, for example, Dietzenbacher and Lahr (2004) and ten Raa (2005) for an introduction of the input-
output method and Wölfl (2006) and Pilat et al. (2006) for recent international applications. Hagman and 
Lind (2008) and Lind (2009, 2010) have in later years used the method in a Swedish context.
22 Note that these calculations are based on statistics for the private sector. To extend the comparison back 
to 1975 one must use the private sector. In the remainder of this section, the focus will be on the entire 
economy and the period 1995-2005. This means that the analysis from Chart 6 should not be confused 
with the rest of the analysis in the section, even if the differences in practice are almost negligible.
Chart 6 
Manufacturing and its Interaction with the Service Sector 
in Sweden, 1975-2005









Indirect employment from final demand of other products 
in the economy
































Direct employment from final demand of manufactured goods
lar has meant that in terms of final demand the 
fall in employment has been limited to about 
300 thousand– from 1,250 thousand to 950 
thousand.23 Hence, this greater inter-industry 
interaction can explain a significant part of the 
Swedish deindustrialization, but since the mid 
1970s there has been a decrease in the total 
number of employed who, directly or indirectly, 
work with production of manufactured goods.
What does the period 1995 and onwards look 
like? The number of employed in the Swedish 
economy who either directly or indirectly work 
with production of manufactured goods can be 
calculated by adding up three categories of 
employed. First, we have those who are directly 
employed in manufacturing through final 
demand for manufactured goods. Second, we 
have those who at all subcontracting levels are 
indirectly employed by final demand for manu-
factured goods (also in their own sector). 
Finally, we have those who are indirectly 
employed in manufacturing due to final demand 
for other products in the economy.24 
If these three categories are added up, Chart 7 
shows that manufacturing employment has 
largely remained unchanged between 1995 and 
2005 – the decrease only amounts to 9,200 peo-
ple. This is equivalent to a fall of 0.9 per cent,25
compared with a 10 per cent decrease in the offi-
cial statistics during the same period. 
How is this total manufacturing employment 
distributed between the manufacturing indus-
tries? As appears from Chart 8, machinery was 
the industry that employed the largest number 
of people in 2005 – 156 thousand, 77 thousand 
of which were directly employed in the own 
industry through meeting final demand, 73 
thousand were indirectly employed as a result of 
final demand, and 6 thousand were employed 
due to final demand of products in other indus-
tries.26 Two other manufacturing industries of 
great importance for total manufacturing 
employment are motor vehicles (143 thousand) 
and food products and beverages (132 thou-
sand). At the other end of the spectrum, there 
are four industries that employ less than 6 thou-
sand people each.
A great deal of the research on deindustrial-
ization is focused on the interaction between 
manufacturing and the knowledge intensive 
service sector and how this has developed over 
time.27 Obviously, defining knowledge inten-
sive services can be problematic, but on the 
basis of the definition of the EU Commission, 
23 Note that this total number of manufacturing employees does not include those persons in the manufacturing 
sector who work at meeting final demand of other industries (Chart 7).
24 For example, final demand for agricultural goods and IT-services means that these sectors must buy inter-
mediate goods from manufacturing in order to satisfy the demand that they meet. 
25 With this method, a total of 1,068,380 persons were in 2005 employed either directly or indirectly in the 
production of manufactured goods. These constituted slightly more than 24 per cent of the total number 
of employed in the economy – a decrease by two percentage points since 1995.
26 The highest employment multipliers are found in pulp, paper and paper products (1.9), wood and prod-
ucts of wood and cork (1.8), motor vehicles (1.8) and food products and beverages (1.8). 
27 See, for example, EU-commission (2004), Kox and Rubalcaba (2007) and OECD (2007).
Chart 7 
Total Manufacturing Employment in Sweden, 1995, 2000 
and 2005
Sources: Statistics Sweden and author’s calculations. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 39 
it is clear from Chart 9 that there has been an 
increase in the number of employed in these 
industries who work at meeting final demand 
for manufactured goods since the mid 1990s – 
from 130 thousand to 177 thousand.28 This 
corresponds to an increase by more than 35 
per cent. An important explanation for this is 
that the number of employed who work indi-
rectly with manufacturing production in busi-
ness service industries has increased from 
slightly more than 80 thousand to more than  
115 thousand during the same period. 
Chart 7 made it clear that due to final demand 
for manufactured goods, the total number of 
indirectly employed increased by more than 10 
thousand between 1995 and 2005. This means 
that the share of business services in indirect 
manufacturing employment has increased from 
16 to 22 per cent; a non-negligible increase in a 
ten-year period.29 For knowledge-intensive ser-
28 The knowledge-intensive service industries are defined in terms of SNA as water transport services (61), air 
transport services (62), post and telecommunication services (64), financial intermediation services and insur-
ance funding services (65-67), real estate services, renting services and other business services (70-74), edu-
cation services (80), health and social work services (85) and recreational, cultural and sporting services (92). 
The business service industries are defined as computer and related services (72), R&D (73) and other business 
services (74). See, for example, OECD (2007) for a discussion of business services, what they contain and how 
they are to be identified. See Baker (2007) and Camacho and Rodriguez (2007) for examples of how IO-analysis 
can be applied to the knowledge intensive service industries.
29 About 80 per cent of indirect manufacturing employment in the business service industries can be 
referred to other business services, 15 per cent to computer services and 5 per cent to R&D.
Chart 8 
Total Manufacturing Employment Distributed between Manufacturing Industries in 
Sweden, 2005
Sources: Statistics Sweden.
Indirect employment from final demand of other products in the economy
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vice industries, their share increased from 25 to 
34 per cent.
How many persons are indirectly employed in 
business services due to final demand of manu-
factured goods and how has this developed over 
time? Out of the 21 industries, the number of 
indirectly employed has, according to Chart 10, 
increased in 19 industries between 1995 and 
2005; in the two industries where there has been 
a decrease, this amounts to less than a total of 
100 employees. The increase in demand for 
intermediate goods from business services is 
thus widely established in the entire manufac-
turing sector. In the vehicle industry, indirect 
employment increased by almost 10 thousand 
employees, which corresponds to an increase of 
almost 80 per cent. Other industries that employ 
Chart 9 
Employment in Knowledge-Intensive Services  
and in Business Services Due to Final Demand  
for Manufactured Goods in Sweden, 1995, 2000, and 2005
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a large number of people in business services are 
machinery, telecom products and chemistry.30
In summary, this section has shown that 
there has been a decrease in the number of 
employed who either directly or indirectly 
works with manufacturing production 
between 1975 and 2005, but the decrease has 
been considerably smaller than what is shown 
in the official statistics. The explanation for 
this is the greater interaction between manu-
facturing and the rest of the economy, in par-
ticular in relation to the service sector. But 
another picture has been emerging since the 
mid-1990s. Total manufacturing employment 
has largely remained unchanged between 
1995 and 2005, mainly due to an increase in 
the indirect employment in the knowledge-
intensive service sector in general and in busi-
ness services in particular. In this sense, dein-
dustrialization is conspicuous by its absence.
Conclusion
Is Sweden being deindustrialized? There has 
been a decrease in manufacturing employment 
in both relative and absolute terms in the post-
war period and there has been a gradual decrease 
in its share of nominal GDP in the same period. 
But at the same time, manufacturing output has 
grown faster than GDP and there has been no 
decrease in domestic demand for manufactured 
goods over time. 
However, the high productivity growth in 
manufacturing – which means that the produc-
tivity level today is on par with the service sector 
– has lead to a fall in the relative prices of manu-
factured goods over time. This has not only 
resulted in a fall in relative employment, but also 
to an increase in the share of real GDP since the 
beginning of the 1990s. In terms of number of 
units produced, we have been in a period of rein-
dustrialization; the falling share of nominal 
GDP is entirely explained by the change in rela-
tive prices, not by a decrease in the demand for 
manufactured goods. The price effect has been 
stronger than the income effect. 
Despite this, there has been a decrease in the 
number of employed who work with satisfying 
final demand for manufactured goods since 
1975, even if the loss is less pronounced than 
what is shown by official statistics. The explana-
tion for this is the increased indirect manufac-
turing employment caused by a greater 
interaction with the rest of the economy; each 
manufacturing employee generates more indi-
rect employment than before. This intensified 
interaction is particularly pronounced in rela-
tion to the service sector in general and its 
knowledge-intensive part in particular. 
This aspect has been of particular importance 
since the crisis years at the beginning of the 
1990s. The number of employed who were in 
some way involved in the production of manu-
factured goods only decreased by 9 thousand 
between 1995 and 2005, and the share of total 
employment only fell from 26 to 24 per cent. In 
the same period, output growth was twice as 
rapid in manufacturing as in the service sector, 
productivity growth was on average about 7 per 
cent per year and the share of real GDP 
increased by 70 per cent. In fact, more than half 
of the productivity growth in the private sector 
can be explained by the rapid improvement in 
manufacturing in this period. The jobless 
growth experienced in Sweden after the turn of 
the millennium was caused by a large global 
demand for manufactured goods which was met 
by increasing the output per hour, not by 
increasing the numbers of employed. Thus, this 
is the reason for the extended lag between GDP 
growth and a reduced unemployment, at the 
30 Note also that there is a considerable variation between industries in how large a share of indirect employ-
ment is due to business services. In the industry for telecom products, the share is as high as 50 per cent and 
in chemistry, it is more than 40 per cent. For wood and products of wood and cork and food products and bev-
erages, the corresponding share amounts to about 10 per cent.  42 NUMBER 22, FALL 2011 
same time as it explains the falling wage share 
within manufacturing. 
The period since the 1990s has been the most 
manufacturing intensive since the 1960s. Con-
sidering that the number of employed who were 
in any way involved in the production of manu-
factured goods and that the share of nominal 
GDP did fall, some label this development as 
deindustrialization. But in terms of output, pro-
ductivity and the share of real GDP, others 
would claim that this is rather a case of reindus-
trialization.
Notwithstanding which interpretation seems 
most reasonable, the picture is considerably 
more complicated than what is too often being 
expressed in the public debate. Deindustrializa-
tion is both a myth and a reality. A more service 
oriented Swedish economy is a fact and a com-
petitive manufacturing sector is an important 
component of that. 
In many ways this discussion is relevant for 
other countries in the developed world. It is 
becoming more unlikely that plants within the 
same company in different Western countries 
will systematically differ in their productivity 
levels. Of course, an important part of the Swed-
ish story is the telecom sector and its impressive 
technological achievements, but the competitive 
pressure that follows from the intensified glo-
balization is a truly world-wide force. We have 
also seen the knowledge-intensive service sector 
grow rapidly in many countries. It is a general 
trend that the indirect employment created by 
manufacturing production has increased over 
the last decades. An increasing number of people 
employed in manufacturing also work on service 
related tasks.
In light of the enormous effects of the finan-
cial crisis on output, it is crucial to create the 
best possible conditions for manufacturing to 
return to full capacity utilization. A growth pol-
icy based on the needs of manufacturing con-
tributes to the growing number of knowledge-
intensive service firms that many experts con-
sider to be the future employment engine, and 
creates the necessary condition for improved 
living standards in the Western world.
References
Baker, P. (2007) ”The Impact of Business-Services 
Use on Client Industries: Evidence from Input-
Output Data,” in L. Rubalcaba, and H. Kox 
(eds.), Business Services in European Economic 
Growth, (London: Palgrave.
Baumol, W.J. (1967) “Macroeconomics of Unbal-
anced Growth: the Anatomy of Urban Crisis,” 
American Economic Review, Vol. 57, pp. 415-426.
Baumol, W. J. (2001) “Paradox of Services: Explod-
ing Costs, Persistent Demand,” in T. ten Raa and 
R. Schettkat (eds.), The Growth of Services Indus-
tries: The Paradox of Exploding Costs and Persistent 
Demand, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar).
Baumol, W. J., S.A. Blackman and E.N. Wolff (1985) 
“Unbalanced Growth Revisited. Asymptotic 
Stagnancy and New Evidence,” American Eco-
nomic Review, Vol. 75, pp. 806-817.
Baumol, W. J. and W.G. Bowen (1966) Performing 
Arts: The Economic Dilemma, (New York:Twenti-
eth Century Fund). 
Baumol, W. J. and E. N. Wolff (1989) Productivity 
and American Leadership: The Long View, (Cam-
bridge MA: MIT Press).
Bell, D. (1976) The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books).
Camacho, J.A. and M. Rodriguez (2007) “Integration 
and Diffusion of KIS for Industry Performance,” 
in L. Rubalcaba and H Kox (eds.), Business Ser-
vices in European Economic Growth, (London: Pal-
grave).
Dietzenbacher, E. and M.L. Lahr (eds.) (2004) Wass-
ily Leontief and Input-Output Economics, (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press).
Edvinsson, R. (2005) Growth, Accumulation and Crisis. 
With New Macroeconomic Data for Sweden 1800-
2000, doctoral thesis Stockholm: Almkvist & 
Wiksell.
EU Commission (2004) “Business-Related Services: 
A Key Driver of European Competitiveness: An 
Enhanced Economic Analysis,” Enterprise DG, 
December.
Hagman, L. and D. Lind (2008) “Det nya 
näringslivet – Samspelet mellan industrin and 
tjänstesektorn,” report from Stockholm, 
Unionen and Almega.
ITPS (2008) “Näringslivets Tillstånd. Tjänstepara-
dox Skapar Tillväxt,” (Östersund: ITPS). INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY MONITOR 43 
Jansson, J.O. (2008) “Tjänstesektorn och Skattepoli-
tiken,” manuscript, underlag till Globalisering-
srådets skattegrupp. 
Kox, H.L.M. and L. Rubalcaba (2007) “Business Ser-
vices and the Changing Structure of European 
Economic Growth,” CPB Memorandum, MPRA 
Paper, No. 3750.
Lind, D. (2009) “Input-Output-analys för Sverige,” 
working paper for Globaliseringsrådet.
Lind, D. (2010) “En input-Output-Analys av svensk 
ekonomi,” in Ekonomisk Debatt.
Nickell, S., S. Redding, and J. Swaffield (200) “The 
Uneven Pace of Deindustrialization in the 
OECD,” World Economy, Vol. 31, No. 9, pp. 
1154-1184.
OECD (2007) ”Globalisation and Structural Adjust-
ment. Summary Report on the Study on Global-
isation and Innovation in the Business Services 
Sector,” (OECD, Paris). 
Palma, G. (2004) “Four Sources of De-Industrialisa-
tion and a New Concept of the Dutch Disease,” 
Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of 
Cambridge.
Pilat, D., A. Cimper, K. Olsen and C. Webb (2006) 
“The Changing Nature of Manufacturing in 
OECD Countries,” STI Working Paper 2006/9, 
(OECD, Paris).
ten Raa, T. (2005) The Economics of Input-Output 
Analysis, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.)
Rowthorn, R., and K. Coutts (2004) “De-Industrial-
ization and the Balance of Payments in Advanced 
Economies,” UN Conference on Trade and 
Development, Discussion Papers, No. 170, 
UNCTAD.
Rowthorn, R., and R. Ramaswamy (1997) “Deindus-
trialization: Causes and Implications,” IMF 
Working Paper, Washington.
SCB (2010) “Fokus på Näringsliv and Arbets-
marknad Hösten 2009,” Information om utbild-
ning och arbetsmarknad 2010:2, Statistics 
Sweden, Stockholm.
Schettkat, R., and L. Yocarini (2003) “The Shift to 
Services: A Review of the Literature,” IZA Dis-
cussion Papers, No. 964, Bonn.
Summers, L. (1985) “Services in the International 
Economy,” in R. P. Inman (ed.), Managing the 
Service Economy, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press).
Whelan, K. (2002) “A Guide to U.S Chain Aggre-
gated Nipa Data,” Review of Income and Wealth, 
Vol. 48, No. 2, pp. 217-233.
Wölfl, A. (2006) “The Interaction between Manufac-
turing and Services and its Role for Productivity 
Growth,” paper presented at Intermediate 
Input-Output Meeting on Sustainability, Trade 
& Productivity, July 26-28, Sendai, Japan.